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In this paper, we explore automobile fuel efficiency policies in the presence of two externalities i) 
a global environmental problem and ii) international innovation spillovers. Using a simple model 
with two regions, we show that both a fuel tax and a tax on vehicles based on their fuel economy 
rating are needed to decentralize the first best. We also show that if policies are not coordinated 
between regions, the resulting gas taxes will be set too low and each region will use the tax on 
fuel rating, to reduce the damage caused by foreign drivers. If standards are used instead of taxes, 
we find that spillovers may alleviate free-riding. Under some conditions, a strict standard in one 
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Climate change concerns and surging oil prices have renewed interest in energy efficiency in 
general and automobile fuel economy in particular. In many parts of the world, public policies 
have been adopted or revised in order to improve the performance of cars either in terms of fuel 
efficiency or GHG emission rates.
1 As recently as December 2007, the US has strengthened their 
Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency Standard (CAFE), requiring that new cars and light trucks 
meet a fleetwide average of 35 miles a gallon by year 2020. In 2006, Japan increased the 
stringency of its fuel economy standards, first adopted in 1999. Back in 2002, the State of 
California adopted a ground-breaking law requiring GHG emission limits from motor vehicles. 
The new limits were issued in 2004 and aimed at reducing emissions rate by about 30% in 2016, 
compared to model year 2004.
 2 Several other US States and some Canadian provinces have since 
announced that they would also adopt them. Meanwhile, the European authorities are considering 
replacing voluntary limits on CO2 emissions per km by mandatory targets.  Limits of either 120 
or 130 grams per km by 2012 are now being debated.
3 Beside standards, several jurisdictions 
have introduced incentive-based instruments to favour fuel efficient cars. For example, in 
Canada, the federal government introduced in 2006 a feebate program taxing the purchase of fuel 
inefficient vehicles, while providing a tax rebate on efficient cars. This program was however 
cancelled few months later because it was poorly designed and faced strong opposition by car 
manufacturers. In Belgium, the Walloon Region has also recently instituted a feebate program 
based on CO2 emissions rates. 
 
Economists have been critical of policies that directly target vehicle fuel or emission rates 
(for an overview of the arguments see Portney et al. 2003 and Fisher et al. 2007). Instead, they 
                                                 
1 While reducing GHG emission rate may be achieved by developing alternative fuels (e.g. biofuels) or changes in air 
conditioners, improvements in fuel rating remain a key strategy for lowering emissions rate. We therefore focus our 
analysis on policies raising fuel efficiency.      
2 At this point, the Federal government disputes California’s right to regulate GHG emissions.   
3 These different standards are not directly comparable. Besides using different measurement units, they are also 
based on fuel rating estimated by different methodologies. However, a comparative analysis by ICCT (2007) reveals 
that Japan and Europe have the most stringent targets while the US (including California) is lagging well behind.     2
recommend either increasing gasoline taxes or imposing a tax on CO2 emissions.
4 The main 
advantage of this approach is that it leads not only to improvements in vehicle fuel rating, but it 
also affects other determinants of gasoline consumption such as driving behaviour or distance.  
For example, Austin and Dinan (2005) show that it is possible to achieve the same 10% reduction 
in the US gasoline consumption at a cost 58% to 71% lower by increasing the gasoline tax rather 
than by tightening the CAFE standards.
5 Furthermore, contrary to the gasoline tax, improving 
fuel efficiency lowers vehicles’ operating cost and thereby stimulates driving. Empirical evidence 
suggests that this ‘rebound effect’ offsets 10% to 20% of the initial fuel reduction associated with 
improved fuel rating (see for example Small and Van Dender, 2007). Worst, the additional 
driving aggravates other traffic-related externalities such as local air pollution, noise and 
congestion (see Parry, 2007). Finally, tax revenues collected by a gasoline tax may be used to 
reduce labour income taxes, eventually increasing the labour supply, thereby bringing additional 
efficiency gains (for an evaluation see West and Williams III, 2005, 2007 and Parry, 2007).
6   
 
However, there are also arguments in favour of vehicle fuel efficiency policies. Some 
suggest that, because of bounded rationality, lack of information or uncertainty about future fuel 
prices, consumers are undervaluing fuel savings.
7 This would explain why some technologies that 
have negative net costs are not adopted. Market power among car manufacturers could also lead 
to distortions on the level of fuel efficiency.   
 
In this paper, we consider another source of distortion that may justify fuel efficiency 
public policies, namely innovation spillovers. This has been mentioned before in the literature but 
never has it been analysed in a formal model for the car industry (for a general discussion on the 
                                                 
4 Note that taxing CO2 emissions is equivalent to taxing gasoline. Indeed, there is no abatement technology for 
carbon dioxide. Obviously, an optimal tax should depend upon the carbon content of the fuel use. This is relevant 
when diesel, compressed natural gas or bio-fuels are being considered. For other pollutants such as NOx, taxing 
gasoline is not equivalent to taxing emissions (see Fullerton and West 2002 on this issue). 
5 Imposing a uniform standard across car manufacturers is also inefficient if marginal costs of improving fuel 
efficiency vary across firms. According to Austin and Dinan, a tradable permit system among manufacturers would 
reduce compliance cost by 16%.    
6 In fact, West and Williams (2005 and 2007) show that mileage and leisure are relative complements implying a 
negative (positive) effect on the labour supply of fuel efficiency improvements (gasoline tax). 
7 Empirical evidence on this issue is still limited and provides conflicting results. Some analysts suggest that car 
buyers only value three years of fuel saving or that they use very high implicit interest rates when trading off higher 
vehicle prices for lower gasoline expenditures (NRC, 2002 and Greene et al., 2005). Others find implicit interest 
rates that are close to those available for car loans (see Dreyfus and Viscusi,1995 or see Verboven, 2002).   3
interactions between environmental and innovation externalities see Jaffe et al., 2005). The idea 
is that improving car fuel economy may require R&D activities whose benefits may not be 
completely appropriated by the investing party. More specifically, we examine the impact of 
international spillovers that may exist between countries or regions. We develop a simple model 
with two regions where agents can choose how many cars to own, how often to drive them, their 
fuel economy and the level of consumption of other goods. Gasoline consumption is responsible 
for a global pollution problem that negatively affects all individuals. The existence of 
international innovation spillovers is modeled in a simple way by assuming that the average 
production cost of cars sold in one region depends upon the level of fuel efficiency in the other 
region. More precisely, we assume that better fuel rating in one region lowers the cost of 
improving fuel efficiency in the other. In this context, we show that a fuel tax is no longer 
sufficient to decentralize the “world” first best outcome. Indeed, the optimal policy calls for a tax 
on gasoline to internalize the environmental externality and a vehicle tax based on the fuel 
economy to internalize the spillovers. Furthermore, the tax revenues collected on fuel rating 
should be returned via a fixed subsidy on vehicle ownership. This combination of a tax and a 
subsidy is in fact reminiscent of the feebate programs adopted by some jurisdictions. Our analysis 
therefore provides a normative justification for having policies targeting fuel rating. We also 
offer a more positive justification by examining the policies followed when there is no 
coordination across regions. In such a setting, we show that each region adopts a gasoline tax that 
is too low compared to the coordinated outcome. Indeed, each region ignores the impact its 
drivers have on the other region. However, each region also sets a domestic tax on vehicles based 
on their fuel rating. This tax does not aim at internalizing the spillovers like in the coordinated 
policy, but rather it is using spillovers as a way to stimulate the fuel efficiency of foreign cars, 
thereby reducing the environmental damage caused by foreigners.   
 
We also analyse more closely standard setting (as opposed to incentive based instruments) 
when there are international spillovers. Using a simplified version of our model where the only 
decision variable is fuel economy rating, we compare the outcome of simultaneous and sequential 
standard setting by governments. We show that standards are set to loose when governments act 
simultaneously because they ignore i) the environmental impact on the other region and ii) the 
positive spillovers. In a sequential game, the underprovision of fuel efficiency may become worse   4
because the free-riding of the first mover may be exacerbated. However, interestingly, we show 
that if spillovers are sufficiently large, sequential-move may improve the final outcome. In fact, 
the follower may react to a stricter standard by the first mover by tightening, rather than 
loosening its own standard. This result may therefore contribute in explaining the wave of 
adoption by US States and Canadian provinces of the standards initially adopted in California.    
 
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we describe the model and analyse 
incentive-based fuel efficiency policies. We first derive the world first best outcome and examine 
how it can be decentralized using taxes and subsidies. We then explore the policies adopted by 
regions when there is no coordination. In section III, we analyse standard setting and illustrate 
our analysis using the California experience. We conclude in section IV.                                        
 
II. Incentive-Based Fuel Efficiency Policies  
 
The Model 
Consider a world with two regions denoted by superscript i=1,2 and each populated by 
i n  agents. 
We assume that all agents are similar and have utility function:  
 
) ( )) , ( , ( F E m v D x u U
i i i i − =        ( 1 )  
 
i x  is the quantity consumed of a general consumption goods and Dis the sub-utility from car 
travel, which is increasing in the number of vehicles 
i ν  owned and miles travelled per car 
i m . 
) (F E  represents the disutility associated with global pollution generated by cars, say climate 
change. It is increasing with worldwide fuel consumption
2 1 F F F + =  with  = i F i i i i g m v n , 
where 
i g  is gallons consumed per mile.  i U  is assumed to be a well behaved utility function. 
 
  Following Innes (1996) and Fisher et al. (2007), we assume that cars are produced by a 
competitive industry with constant returns to scale.
8 Furthermore, we assume that there is no joint 
production meaning that car companies are different in the two regions. While these assumptions 
                                                 
8 Each region is sufficiently large so that a large number of plants can produce at the minimum efficiency scale.   5
are not necessarily realistic, they focus the analysis on the interaction between cost spillovers and 
environmental externalities.
9 We discuss the impact their impacts on our results in the conclusion.  
The long term average production cost of a car sold in country i is given by  ) , (
2 1 g g h
i . We 


















g g h . In other words, fuel efficiency can only be 
improved (i.e. lowering i g ) by progressively installing more costly fuel saving technologies. This 
is a common hypothesis in the literature which is backed by factual evidence.
10 Note that this is a 
long term relationship implying that it takes into account that a stricter fuel efficiency target in 
region i is going to stimulate innovative activities, thereby limiting the production cost increase.
11 
There is indeed mounting empirical evidence that environmental regulations induce R&D and 
patenting activities (see Landjouw and Mody, 1996, Jaffe and Palmer 1997, Brunnermeier and 
Cohen, 2003, Popp 2006) and give rise to lower abatement costs (see Fisher and Newell, 2007).   
 
These induced innovations also explain our additional hypothesis that 
i h depends 
upon
j g . More precisely, we assume that the innovative activities stimulated by a stricter fuel 
efficiency target in region j generate positive spillovers in region i , thereby leading to a reduction 







g h ) and ii) in the marginal average cost increase 







j i g g
h i
g g h ).
12  Clearly, this 
specification should be viewed as a short cut aimed at capturing the main implications of 
international spillovers while keeping the analysis simple.
13 International spillovers occur when 
the prices of intermediate inputs do not fully incorporate the quality improvement resulting from 
                                                 
9 We assume away market power to avoid adding an additional source of distortion that would blur the analysis. 
Combining joint production and perfect competition would also make the analysis much more cumbersome.  
10 NRC (2002) reviews several emerging technologies for improving fuel rating (e.g. use of advanced low friction 
lubricant, cylinder deactivation, continuously variable transmission) and evaluates their expected cost. Based on this 
review, incremental cost curves as a function of fuel rating are constructed for different vehicle types. These curves 
are decreasing and convex as we assume in our model.    
11 The automobile industry is the largest investor in R&D activities in the OECD.  In 2003, it represented over 13% 
of all R&D expenditures (see Hashmi and Van Biesebroeck, 2007).  
12 Recall once again that improving fuel efficiency means lowering g. 
13 Also note that  ) , (
2 1 g g h
i  could also represent a reduced form for other type of phenomenon such as economies 
of scale in the cost of adopting new technologies, learning by doing. We come back on this in the conclusion.          6
foreign innovations.
14 It is also the result of the public good aspects of knowledge. International 
trade, foreign direct investments, international alliances (licensing agreements, joint ventures), 
migration of scientists, international conferences or industrial spying may therefore all contribute 
to international spillovers. There is now a fairly large amount of empirical literature suggesting 
that foreign R&D is indeed a significant source of domestic productivity growth.
15 An interesting 
example is Bernstein and Mohnen (1998) who use data for 11 R&D intensive sectors, including 
transportation equipment (automobile production being part of this sector). They find significant 
spillovers from the US to Japan over the 1962-1986 period. In fact, their results suggest that a one 




The World First Best Outcome 
 
A social planner interested in achieving the world first best outcome will try to maximize the sum 
of all the agents’ utility under a world resource constraint. Formally, 
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The price of  xis normalized to one while p , the resource cost of gasoline, is assumed to be 
exogenous.  y  stands for the per capita quantity of resources available in each region. After 
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14 This will be the case unless the innovator is able to extract the entire surplus generated by its discovery.  
15 For example Coe and Helpman, 1995, Bernstein and Mohnen, 1998, Madsen, 2007.  See also Brandstetter, 1998 
and Cincera and Van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, 2001 for surveys.  
16 More recently, Popp (2006) finds evidence of international knowledge spillovers in air pollution control 
technologies. Using patent citations, he finds that countries that are late to enact environmental regulation have 
domestic innovative activities that build upon foreign patents of countries that regulated early. For example, the US 
regulated NOx emissions from power plants later than Japan. This late regulation did stimulate US patenting 
activities that were based upon (citing) existing Japanese patents. 
17 A subscript indicates a partial derivate so that, for example, Dm
i represents the derivative of D with respect to m
i.   7
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The interpretation of these conditions is standard and involves the balancing of marginal 
social benefits and costs. For example, conditions (6) state that the fuel consumption rate of a car 




i h v − ) is equal to the resulting marginal social benefit of this reduction. The marginal benefit 
has three components. First, the increased fuel efficiency lowers the agent fuel consumption by 
i iv m , which reduces the environmental disutility of all agents ( λ / ) (
2 1
F E n n + ).
19 Second, the 
agent’s fuel costs are reduced by i iv pm . Third, the decline in  i g leads to positive spillovers for 









.  Next, we examine how the first best can be 
decentralized through taxes and subsides.     
 
 
Decentralizing the world first best outcome 
 
We assume that the social planner can impose taxes on gasoline ( i e ), which may potentially 
differ across regions. We also allow for the possibility of a two part tax on vehicles: the first part 
being fixed per vehicle ( i s ) and the second part depending upon the chosen fuel consumption 
rate (
i ig t ). Note that these taxes may be negative (i.e. a subsidy). As usual, net tax revenues are 
returned to agents as a lump sum rebate which, for simplicity, we assume is included in the 
agent’s income y . Based on these taxes, agents and car manufacturers in each region act 
simultaneously. Region i’s agent solves the following problem: 
) 7 ( , , ,
] ) ( [ ) ( )) , ( , (
i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i
v m x wrt
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where  i k is the price of a vehicle (including any tax or subsidy). The first order conditions are: 
                                                 
18 To be concise, we do not repeat the resource constraint which is obviously also part of the first order conditions.   
19 Note that dividing by the marginal utility of income (λ ) translates the utility change in monetary terms.   8
0 = −
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Contrary to the social planner, the individual does not take into account the impact of his 
car travel decision on the global environment.
20 Competition in the car manufacturing industry 
leads to 
i i i i i g t s g g h k + + = ) , (
2 1  with 
i g minimizing the total costs for a consumer of owning 
and operating a vehicle: 
 
i
i i i i i i j i i
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In other words, competition leads to cars with a consumption rate that drivers desire. The first 
order condition of this problem is: 
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Comparing (3)-(6) with (8)-(10) and (12), we immediately find that, besides λ δ = i , the first best 
conditions match those in the decentralized setting if:
 21 
λ
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20 We assume that the number of agents is so large that it is a good approximation to assume that the agent ignores 
the impact of its travel decision on F .  
21 As always, we assume that the social planner can, without any cost, transfer income across individuals and regions 
to insure λ δ = i .    9
Matching conditions (4) and (9) leads to the usual Pigovian tax (see for example Fullerton and 
West, 2002). This gas tax, which is here equivalent to an emission tax, fully internalizes the 
external environmental cost associated with driving. However, this instrument alone is not 
sufficient in our setting to achieve the first best. Indeed, the spillovers - another source of 
externality – also require taxing cars based on their fuel consumption rate in order to take into 
account the knowledge externality. By matching conditions (6) and (12), we find the appropriate 
tax rate  i t , which depends upon the importance of spillovers 
j
gi h . It also depends upon the size 
of the fleet benefiting from the knowledge spillovers ( j jv n ) relative to the size of the fleet being 
taxed ( i iv n ). Finally by matching (5) and (10), we also find that the revenues collected through t
i 
should be returned as a subsidy to car ownership. Interestingly, this two part tax structure (a 
subsidy on car ownership plus a tax based on the fuel consumption rate) is reminiscent of the 
feebate programs adopted or discussed in several countries.   
 
The first best can in principle be achieved when regions or countries cooperate. One way 
to build the grand coalition is by designing a system of transfers that makes all countries better 
off (Chander and Tulkens, 1994). In most discussions on international environmental agreements 
only international transfers (in order to have full participation) and an emission reduction target 
by country is needed. Here, we need to force countries to use an extra tax instrument to address 
the R&D externality.  
 
Uncoordinated policies in the two regions 
 
Next, we examine the situation where there is no coordination in the policies followed by the two 
regions. We assume a two-stage game with both governments simultaneously setting their policy 
instruments at the first stage. At the second stage, consumers and car manufacturers in both 
regions simultaneously take their consumption and production decisions based on the first stage 
policy parameters. This game can be resolved by backward induction by first deriving stage two 
optimal decisions as functions of the policy instruments. In each region, consumers and car 
manufacturers’ optimisation problems are identical to (7) and (11), leading to first order 
conditions similar to (8)-(10) and (12). For each region, the solution to this system provides a link 
between a region’s policy choice and its agents’ optimal decisions. But because of the spillovers,   10
the decisions of agents in one region also depend upon the fuel consumption rate in the other 
region.  Formally, for region j we have:
 22 
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(16) to (19) define a system of 8 equations with 8 unknowns whose solution gives stage two 
optimal choices as a function of stage one policy decisions of both governments.
23 Stage two 
optimal decisions may then be plugged into the governmental objective functions to solve the 
game. Rather than proceeding in this way, it is more revealing to start by analysing government i 
decision problem, assuming that it directly controls 
i i i i g v m x , , ,  while decisions are 
decentralized in region j. Government i objective function is then given by: 
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with  (.) (.) (.) ) , , , , , (
j j j j i j j j j g m v n g y p s t e F =    (21) 
and where  (.) (.), (.), j j j g m v  are abbreviations for the functions (16) to (19). Government i 
realizes that its fuel efficiency target (
i g ) is going to affect foreigners’ decisions, which in turn 
have an impact on its citizens. First, 
i g has an impact on the fuel consumed by foreign drivers 
and thereby on the level of domestic environmental disutility. Second, 
i g  is also affecting 
j g  
which in turn has an impact on the cost of domestic cars via the spillovers. The first order 
conditions for this problem are:               
0 = −
i
xi u λ          ( 2 2 )  
                                                 
22 As the environmental externality is separable in the utility function (1), it will not affect the consumption of private 
commodities. 
23 For example,  ) , , , , , , , ( p y s t e s t e g j j j i i i i .   11
0 = − −
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To decentralize this outcome, government i should set its policy instruments so that conditions 
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i i i g t s − =       ( 2 8 )  
 
Without coordination, both governments set fuel tax rates that are too low when compared to the 
world first best (compare (26) with (13)). It is easy to understand why: each government only 
cares about the environmental damage to its citizens. In other words, it ignores the environmental 
impact of its citizens’ driving on foreigners. From (27), we observe that government i may want 
to stimulate its citizens’ demand for fuel efficiency by imposing  0 > i t  if this reduces fuel 






F ). Note that the second term of (27) is an ‘echo 
effect’: if reducing  i g lowers j g , this will bring back positive spillovers to region i ( i
g j h ). Once 
again the tax collected on vehicle performance should be returned as a lump-sum subsidy on car 
ownership (equation (28)). In the uncoordinated case, the motivation for taxing vehicle fuel rating 
is therefore quite different than in the world first best situation. Indeed, the tax does not aim at 
internalizing the spillovers but rather it is using the innovation spillovers in order to mitigate the 










































(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)      (29)   12
The impact of 
i g on foreign gasoline consumption depends upon how it is going to affect foreign 
vehicle fuel rating and the vehicle and mileage demand. The sign and magnitude of these effects 
depends upon the structure of the preferences and the cost function. However, since reducing 
i g  
lower the marginal cost of providing fuel efficiency improvement in region j, we may expect a 
lowering of 
j g in equilibrium. The impact on mileage and vehicle number is difficult to predict 
as both operating and ownership cost are affected in equilibrium by
i g .
24   
  
To gain more insight, suppose that government i only considers the impact of its decision 
on foreign car manufacturers, wrongly ignoring the reaction of foreign drivers.
25 In such a setting, 
government i only considers the reaction of region j car manufacturers. For these manufacturers, 
j g is such that: 
 
0 ) ( = + + +
j j j i
g m e p t h j  
By totally differentiating this condition, we obtain:     
















which justifies taxing vehicle in region i. Note that if spillovers have no impact on the other 
region’s marginal average cost ( 0 =
j
g g i j h ), region i has no control over foreign emissions. In this 
case, a gasoline tax is sufficient to achieve the outcome that the regional government can reach 
without coordination. If at the other extreme, spillovers from region i fully compensate region j’s 




g g j j i j h h = ), government i has the 
same control over foreign car performance than on its domestic fleet.
26 Note that, even if the 
                                                 
24 How these variables change in equilibrium also depends on their relationship in the utility function. Empirical 
evidence suggests that mileages per car are declining with the number of cars owned, suggesting these goods are 
substitutes. 
25 Specifically, government i assumes that m
j and v
j remain constant. 
26 Note that this situation could also occur if cars in the two regions are produced by the same companies (joint 
production) and that adjustment costs and relative market size lead manufacturers to produce only one type of car for 
the two markets. For example, Canadian models are usually either very close or identical to their US counterparts. It 
may therefore be that US policy makers have control over the performance of Canadian cars. Another example is the   13
choice of 
i g has a limited impact on 
j g , the overall benefit of a small reduction in reducing 
j g  
for region i may still be significant if the total vehicle-miles in region j , 
j j j m v n , is large (see 
(29)).  
 
  To summarize, we find that a fuel tax (or emission tax) may not be sufficient to insure the 
first best outcome when there are international knowledge spillovers. Taxing cars on their fuel 
rating is required to internalize the spillover effects between regions. If governments are unable 
to coordinate their policies, we find that a tax based on fuel rating may be a way to have an 
indirect impact on foreign emissions.   
  
As mentioned in the introduction, several countries are adopting standards rather than 
taxes and subsidies to stimulate automobile fuel efficiency. It is therefore interesting to analyse 
standard setting when there are international knowledge spillovers. To that end, we use in the 
next section a simplified version of our model.       
 
III. Fuel Efficiency Standards  
 
We now consider a partial equilibrium model where the only control variables of governments 
are the car fuel consumption rates (
i g ). To simplify further, assume that i) both regions have an 
identical number of agents ( n n n = = 2 1 ), ii) each agent has one car ( i i n v = ) and iii) the distance 
driven is fixed and identical for all ( m m m = = 2 1 ). As a benchmark, we start by characterizing 
the world first best solution.  In this simplified world, the social planner objective is to minimize 
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export of used cars from Europe to Africa.  Improvements in fuel efficiency in Europe increase therefore in the long 
run the performance of cars in Africa.      14
(.) E  represents the per capita environmental damage expressed in monetary value as a function 
of total fuel consumption.
27 The optimal policy calls for setting a standard in each region so that 
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Positive knowledge spillovers ( 0 >
j
gi h ) favour the adoption of stricter standards. For the case of 
uncoordinated standards in the two regions, we consider two scenarios, depending on whether 
governments move simultaneously or sequentially.   
 
Simultaneous standard setting 
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   (24) 
The first order condition is 
 
i
g F i h pm nm E − = +       ( 2 5 )  
which implicitly defines a reaction function ( ) (
j i g g ). The intersection of both regions reactions 
function gives the equilibrium standards. Comparing (25) with (23), it is immediate that standards 
are set too loose when comparing to the first best. Without coordination, cars have fuel 
consumption rates that are too high for two reasons: i) each government ignores the impact its 
drivers have on the other region and ii) knowledge spillovers are not fully used. Both aspects lead 
to an under-valuation of the marginal benefit of fuel efficiency. 
 
Sequential standard setting 
 
The simultaneous game results are not particularly surprising. More interesting is the case of 
sequential decision making. Suppose government 1 decides first on fuel efficiency. Government 
2 follows suit after having observed region 1’s decision. Using backward induction, government 
                                                 
27 It is different from E() in Section II, which represented the agent’s disutility linked to pollution.   15
2’s decision problem is identical to (24). However, at the first stage of the game, government 1 
can take into account the impact of its decision on government 2’s decision. Formally, it sets its 
standard by solving: 
 
( ) 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 )) ( , ( )) ( ( pmg g g g h nm g g g E Min + + +  (26) 
 
The first order condition is: 




























is the slope of government 2’s reaction function. Differentiating (25) with respect to 





















   (28) 
which may be positive or negative. Indeed, if there are no knowledge spillovers ( 0
2
1 2 =
g g h ), an 
effort by country 1 to reduce emissions by lowering 
1 g  is partially compensated by a higher
2 g . 
This is the traditional free-riding curse. However, if positive spillovers are sufficiently important, 
a higher fuel standard in country 1 leads to the adoption of a stricter standard in country 2. In 
turn, this reaction pushes region 1 to adopt a stricter standard, thereby partially countervailing the 
free-riding incentive. When the marginal environmental damage function is constant ( 0 = FF E ), a 
higher fuel efficiency policy in one country will generate a larger emission reduction in the other 
region via the innovation spillovers. Once again, even if the spillovers are limited, the potential 
benefits may be important if the other region is large. To illustrate the relevance of these effects, 
we develop in the next section a simple numerical example, which is based on the Californian 
standards and their potential impacts on the rest of the US and Canada.        16
Illustration  
 
The purpose of this example is not to provide a comprehensive and detailed numerical simulation 
but rather to provide a ‘back of the envelop’ computation of how and to what extend the effects 
described above may be of relevance. In 2004, California imposed a 30% reduction in GHG 
emission rates by 2016. While the standards vary by type of vehicles and allow reducing GHG 
emission rates via improvements in air conditioning systems, the California Air Resources Board 
(2008) estimates that they would raise the average fuel efficiency of the fleet from about 25.1 to 
35.7 MPG or equivalently reduce the fuel consumption rate from 3.98 to 2.8 gallons per 100 
miles. To simplify the illustration, assume that i) these standards have no impact on driving 
distance or on the number of vehicles and ii) California ignores the ‘eco effect’ (i.e. it assumes 
that  0 = Cal
g
h RUSC ). Based on our simplified model, the standard should be set so that the marginal 
fuel cost saving (MFCS) plus the marginal environmental benefit (MEB) equal the marginal cost 
(MC) imposed by the standard via higher vehicle prices. We evaluate MFCS, MEB and MC in 
annual and per capita terms.  
 
Based on Fisher et al. (2007), the price increase of a vehicle as the fuel consumption rate 
is reduced may be approximated by: 
) ( 1941 213
_
g g− +  
with 
_
g  being the initial level of the fuel consumption rate (in our case 
_
g =3.98). Assuming that 
vehicles last for 14 years, government uses a social discount rate (r) of 5% and given that in the 
US the number of cars per capita is about 0.8 (Harrington, 2008), the per capita marginal cost of 
reducing g is approximately:
28 
) ( 150 16
_
g g MC − + = . 
 
For  MFCS, we use a per Californian annual driving distance of 8,015 miles (FWH 
Statistics, 2005) and a 2004 average price of gasoline net of taxes in California of 1.59$ per 
                                                 
28 We multiply the vehicle price increase by 0.8 x (1-d)/(1-d
14) with d=1/(1+r).   17
gallon.
29 The total reduction in fuel expenditure is thus given by  ) ( 15 . 80 59 . 1
_
g g x − , implying a 
MFCS constant at 127$.  
 
For MEB, we only consider climate changes as it is the driving motivation behind the 
Californian initiative and we assume that environmental damage is linear in the quantity of fuel 




g Cal Cal m n m n w Cal
RUSC
∂
∂ +  
with w the constant per capita environmental damage generated by one gallon of gasoline. Cal 
stands for California and RUSC for rest of the US and Canada. For the population figures, we use 
Cal n =36 millions, 
RUSC n =300 millions and for the mileage per capita (expressed in 100 miles) 
Cal m =80.15 and 
RUSA m =100. Following Fisher et al. (2007), we assume a value of 50$ per ton of 
CO2 implying a worldwide damage of 12 cents per gallon of gasoline. If damages are equally 
distributed across the world, the damage per capita is then a meagre 0.12$/6.6 billions! In fact, if 
we use this figure, MEB is negligible even in the best case scenario, where the rest of the US and 






g ). Indeed, MEB is less than 0.6$ and 
represents about 0.5% of MFCS. From these simple computations, we derive a first observation: 
California should somehow take into account the world damage for climate change to be a 
significant factor affecting the stringency of the standards. 
 
Therefore let us assume that California evaluates MEB using the worldwide climate 
change damage of 12 cents, which per Californian translates into 0.12$/
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g  (absence of spillovers), MEB is 9.6$ which combines with MFCS and takes into 
account  MC, justifies a standard of 3.16 gallon per 100 miles. This leads to our second 
observation: if Californian standards have no impact on fuel efficiency elsewhere, climate change 
                                                 
29 Based on the California Energy Commission, the 2004 yearly average price of gasoline was 2.12$ per gallon so 
that the price net of taxes was about: 2.12/1.08 (sale taxes of 8%) minus the federal and state excise taxes of 0.364$. 
30 Obviously if every region takes into account the world damage, we could end-up with an over-production of the 
public good in the sequential setting.       18
concerns only marginally affect the standard. Indeed, compared to a fuel rating based on MFCS 
exclusively, MEB increases the stringency of the standard by less than 3%.
31 
 
  At the other extreme, suppose that innovation spillovers are such that the rest of the US 






g ), MEB is then 109.6$ and calls for a standard 






g  or 
equivalently that 56% of the rest of the US and Canada adopt the Californian standards. Recall 
that, as of May 2008, 16 US States and Canadian Provinces, representing about half of the 
population, have announced that they would adopt the California norms. Consequently, a third 
observation we can make is the following: having an impact on the out of State fuel efficiency 
may be a key in understanding the Californian policy. In fact, this consideration is made explicit 
in some of the State official report. For example, the California Global Warming Solution Act of 
2006 assumes that stricter domestic regulations will favour stricter standard abroad: “…actions 
taken by California to reduce emissions…will have far-reaching effects by encouraging other 
states, the federal government, and other countries to act” (Chapter 2, section (d), page 89).  
Obviously, several factors could explain this bandwagon effect. It therefore remains to evaluate, 






In this paper we constructed a simple model to understand the widespread use of unilateral fuel 
efficiency policies for cars. The model contains environmental spillovers generated by car use, 
but also innovation spillovers associated to making more fuel efficient cars. The cooperative 
solution requires the use of extra incentives to increase the fuel efficiency selected by each 
region. In the non-cooperative solution, each region uses the innovation spillovers as a way to 
                                                 
31 MFCS justifies a fuel rating of 3.24. 
32 Note that the role of innovation is clearly a central aspect of Californian strategy as expressed in the State Global 
Warming Solution Act of 2006: ‘More importantly, investing in the development of innovative and pioneering 
technologies…will provide an opportunity for the state to take a global economic and technological leadership role 
in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases’ 
   19
counter the under-taxation of the environmental externality resulting from the lack of 
cooperation. This means that each region imposes a domestic car tax on fuel rating with the 
objective of improving the fuel rating abroad, thereby reducing pollution caused by foreigners. If 
standards are used to improve fuel efficiency, we find that spillovers may somewhat alleviate 
free-riding. Indeed, we show that, in a sequential game, a more ambitious fuel efficiency standard 
by the leader may stimulate the following region to also adopt more ambitious standards. 
 
  In our model, we have assumed perfect competition in the car markets. Adding market 
power would certainly be interesting but it is unlikely to affect the main conclusions of our 
analysis. Indeed, even with market power, it is very likely that the equilibrium fuel economy of 
cars will depend upon the marginal cost of offering more efficient cars. Policy in one region 
should therefore still have an impact on the other region’s car performance when there are 
spillovers. For simplicity, we have also assumed that manufacturers are only producing cars in 
one region. With multi-product and multi-market firms, some spillovers are probably going to be 
internalized. However, it is likely that spillovers continue to plague the innovation process.   
Moreover, even if the world car market was dominated by a monopolist internalizing all 
innovation spillovers, each region government may still have an incentive to affect the fuel 
efficiency of car sold abroad.
33   
 
More generally, all what is needed to justify fuel efficiency policy in an international 
setting is some cost dependence between the vehicles sold in the two regions. Here, we have 
assumed that innovation spillovers create such a link but other factors may be at play, such as 
economies of scale in the production of fuel saving technologies or learning by doing. For 
example, if the cost of a new fuel saving technology is declining with the number of equipped 
vehicles, a standard that forces adoption in one region may reduce the adoption cost in other 
regions. Also, with multi-market firms, adjustment costs associated with offering market specific 
models could lead to policy interdependence.   
     
                                                 
33 Obviously in the coordinated case, a gasoline tax should be sufficient to decentralize the first best outcome.   20
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